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THE 1999 AMENDMENTS TO THE ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN NEW YORK'S CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Roy Simon*

I. INTRODUCTION

It is an honor to be on a program named for a lawyer who is so
beloved and esteemed and who devoted as much of his own professional
life to the legal world and to the improvement of the legal profession as
Neil Shayne did. It is a great opportunity to be on a panel with all of
these people who devote so much of their professional lives to
improving the legal profession.
I will focus tonight only on the 1999 Amendments to the Ethical
Considerations ("ECs") in New York's Code of Professional
Responsibility. There has not been a lot of attention paid to these
Amendments, partly because the ECs are adopted only by the New York
State Bar Association.' They are not adopted by the courts.2 As such,
they do not have Part 1200 numbers and are not part of the official
compilation of New York Codes, Rules and Regulations ("NYCRR").
Therefore, when the stories came out in mid-July about the Amendments
to the Code of Professional Responsibility, they generally did not cover
anything about the ECs.' Although, as Steve Krane mentioned, the ECs
are formally considered aspirational and are not mandatory, they are
very influential nevertheless. The courts like to look at them to interpret
what the Disciplinary Rules ("DRs") mean and to give a little more
* Professor of Law and the Director of the Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra
University School of Law. B.A., 1973, Williams College; JLD., 1977, New York University School
of Law.
I. See RoY SIMON, SIMON's NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
ANNOTATED xi (2000 ed.).

2. Seeki.
3. See, e.g., Steven C. Krane, Amendments to the DR's. N.Y. PROF. REsP. REP. fN.Y. Prof.
Resp. Rep., LLC, Larchmont, N.Y.), Aug. 1999, at 1.
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"pizzazz" and a little more of a lofty feeling to opinions in cases about
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and motions to disqualify counsel.
I do not know how many lawyers have ever been the target of a motion
to disqualify but it is very disconcerting. Essentially, a lawyer is being
told that he is unethical. A great deal of guidance on conflicts of interest
can be found in the ECs.

II. THE 1999 AMENDMENTS TO THE ECs
There are nine Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Canons 1, 4, 8, and 9, there are no changes whatsoever to the ECs. In
Canons 3 and 6 there are only small changes. In Canon 3, EC 3-8 was
slightly amended to include the word "compensation" to the non-lawyer
employee payment exception contained in DR 3-102(A)(3).' The
amendments to the ECs in Canon 6 basically say that lawyers can
practice in limited liability partnerships ("LLPs") or limited liability
companies ("LLCs") without violating DR 6-102 by prospectively
limiting liability to clients for legal malpractice. 6 A lawyer's retainer
agreement cannot ethically contain a covenant stating that the client will
not sue the lawyer if the lawyer commits malpractice. 7 And EC 6-6 has
been amended to take into account the fact that a lot of lawyers now
practice in LLPs and LLCs, which is okay because, as EC 6-6 now
explains, lawyers may ethically limit their liability that way to the extent
permitted by law.'
Notice that in less than two pages I have covered more than half of
the Code. I will now discuss a number of the recent amendments to the
ECs contained in Canons 2, 5, and 7.
A.

Canon 2--"A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in
Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal CounselAvailable"

In Canon 2, there are a couple of very interesting changes. DR 2101(B), the basic rule on advertising, used to explicitly prohibit a lawyer
from engaging in the use of advertisements that contained puffery or
self-laudation. The 1999 Amendments eliminated the explicit
prohibition, but a new EC 2-10 explains that communications involving
puffery are "prohibited to the extent that they are false, deceptive, or
4.

See SIMON, supranote 1,at 11, 243, 495, 502-03.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 239.
See id. at 422.
See id.
See id.
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misleading." 9 But have you ever seen an advertisement that does not
laud the lawyer? Have you ever seen a lawyer advertise by stating that
he is not such a good lawyer, but that you should call him because he
needs the business? Yet I do not think anybody was ever disciplined for
self-laudation, so perhaps that is why the old ban on puffery and selflaudation is gone," but in its place there is a new sentence in EC 2-10
which provides: "Although communications involving puffery and
claims that cannot be measured or verified are not specifically referred
to in DR 2-101, such communications would be prohibited to the extent
that they are false, deceptive or misleading."" So be careful if you say,
for example, that your law firm is the best in Nassau County, the most
experienced in Suffolk County, or the preeminent law firm in a
particular field. These examples would still be considered "deceptive or
misleading" because the examples cannot be verified.
Another new sentence at the end of EC 2-10 states: "A lawyer who
advertises in a state other than New York should comply with the
advertising rules or regulations applicable to lawyers in that state.'""
What about web pages? The advertising rules were the first ones to be
worked on. There was a special commission on advertising that was
superseded by the Krane Committee.'" I am willing to bet that at the time
this was first thought about, nobody was thinking about the Internet. I
am not sure how Internet advertising issues wrill be handled, but there are
a number of ethics opinions on the subject by the New York City Bar
Ethics Committee, 4the New York State Bar Ethics Committee,' and the
Nassau County Bar Ethics Committee.'" I think that if a lawyer targets
specific print advertising or buys radio time in another jurisdiction, then
he is supposed to comply with this EC, but of course the ECs are not
mandatory so I wonder whether there is any real meaning to it. Certainly
we will have to think hard about the regulation of lawyer advertising in
the context of the Web.

9. Il at 76.
10. See id.
11. Id at75.
12. Id.
13. See Special Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Referral Services, INew 1ork Staie Bar
Ass'n, Attorney Advertising Committee Report, Sept. 1995. at 1 ("The New York State Bar

Association's Special Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Lawyer Referral Sezriea
Regulation... was appointed by President John Bracken in the spring of 1993 ... .".
14. See e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Profi and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2000-1 (2000) (discussing the use of Interet Web sites for advertising and solicitation).
15. See SIMON, supranote 1, at 78.
16. See id. at8O.
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Another change can be found in EC 2-14. This is an amusing EC
because it fills out in fairly graphic detail what is meant by false,
deceptive, or misleading communications. 7 EC 2-14 was a vacant lot. It
had been repealed some years ago,' but now something has been put in
its place which says: "The following, if used in public communications
or communications to a prospective client, are likely to be false,
deceptive or misleading."' 9 I think the word "public" means
communications through the media. But how does the new language
apply to a "prospective client?" Does it mean that a lawyer cannot say
the items listed in EC 2-14 when somebody comes to that lawyer's
private office for an interview? In any event, it would likely be deceptive
and misleading if an attorney promised the outcome in any legal
matter.0 I recently came across a case from South Carolina where a
client sued the lawyer for failing to live up to a promise, 2' and I tell my
students never to promise the client a certain outcome because the client
can sue if the lawyer does not live up to the promise. Now EC 2-14
provides another reason for not promising the outcome, stating explicitly
that "a communication that promises the outcome of any legal matter" is
likely to be deemed "false, deceptive or misleading,"2 which is
unethical.
It is also unethical to have "a communication that states or implies
that the lawyer has the ability to influence improperly a court, court
officer, governmental agency or government official."- Do not say to a
client: "I know Bob the court clerk, so I will get this case handled right
away." Do not drop names about court personnel or judges. Also
improper is "a letter or other written communication made to appear as a
legal document." 24 There actually are some lawyers who send out
advertisements that look like court documents. This is not permitted, but
targeted mail in general is permitted because an attorney has had a First
Amendment right to do so since 1988." In addition, the following are
likely to be considered false, deceptive, or misleading:
[T]he inclusion of names, addresses and telephone numbers as required
by DR 2-101(K) in a manner that is too small or too fast for an average
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 75-76.
Seeid. at75.
Id.
See id.
See Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. R.L. Hitchcock, 531 S.E.2d 282,285-86 (S.C. 2000).
SIMON, supranote 1, at 75.
Id.
Id.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,479 (1988).
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viewer to receive the information in a meaningful fashion; ... the use
of dollar signs, the terms "most cash" or "maximum dollars," or like
terms that suggest the outcome of the legal matter;... the use of an

actor to portray the lawyer or another representative of the lawyer's
firm; or ... any other use of an actor or use of a dramatization without

meaningful disclosure thereof.
I wish the disciplinary committee had the money to hire more staff
attorneys so that these problems could be dealt with more systematically.
Advertising is the most public of all the actions by lawyers and yet,
realistically, the disciplinary authorities would rather go after an
embezzler than after somebody who advertises deceptively.
Now, I come to a very interesting issue. There was a lawyer who
had copies of settlement checks on the desk under a glass desktop. The
checks had dollar signs, of course. Is that prohibited under EC 2-14?
Literally, yes.
B. Canon 5-"A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional
Judgmenton Behalf of a Client'
Canon 5 has some changes that are highly significant. In EC 5-4,
the entire first paragraph is nev" and it makes two major points. One
point is that an attorney cannot use information obtained from a client to
make an investment that damages the client. 3 For example, if the client
is buying up vacant lots in order to develop a housing site or strip mall,
the attorney cannot buy one of those vacant lots in the hopes of making a
profit by selling it to the client. Another point is that if a client is a
dentist or an accountant, for example, it is permissible for the attorney to
enter into "standard commercial transactions" with those clients (i.e., to
use those clients for dentistry or accounting) because those services are
marketed on the same terms to others.2
The changes in EC 5-15 are much more significant. The last three
sentences of EC 5-15 are new.? The changes begin with the word
"simultaneous" and provide that "[s]imultaneous representation in
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally diverse,
such as competing economic enterprises, does not by itself require
consent of the respective clients."3' So if an attorney represents one
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

SoloN, supra note 1, at 75-76.
See1d. at317.
See id.
See id.
See &Lat 330.
Ild. (underscoring omitted).
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music store and then a second client who owns a music store hires the
lawyer, this does not necessarily mean that the lawyer has a conflict,
even though it may seem so.
In some cases, such as a zoning variation, representing competing
enterprises is not advisable because one client may want the variance
and the competitor may oppose it. However, just because an attorney
represents two companies in the same industry does not automatically
mean that there is a conflict. Similarly, and this is one of the most
vexing issues for lawyers, suppose an attorney is arguing one position
about the law on behalf of one client and the opposite position on behalf
of another client in two unrelated matters, with one pending in Nassau
Supreme Court and the other in Suffolk Supreme Court. This is
ordinarily considered permissible and is not considered a conflict.32
There is a caveat to this, however, where the representation of either
client would be adversely affected.33
EC 5-16 contains a very important change 4 The second sentence
now states:
before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, the lawyer should
explain fully to each client the implications of the common
representation and otherwise provide to each client information
reasonably sufficient, giving due regard to the sophistication of the
client, to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the potential
conflict, and should accept or continue employment only if each client
consents, preferably in writing. 5
The phrase "giving due regard to the sophistication of the client" is
tremendously important. Not all clients are the same. A sophisticated
business client will not require as much disclosure as a new personal
injury client. A lawyer with a personal injury or matrimonial practice
will have to explain possible conflicts to clients in some detail because
personal injury and divorce clients are not-we hope-repeat players in
the legal system. A lawyer dealing with sophisticated business people
who have a lot of experience, on the other hand, will not have to make
such detailed disclosures, particularly if dealing with in-house counsel,
32. See id. (quoting the second amendment to Ethical Consideration 5-15 and stating that "a
lawyer may generally represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has
arisen in different cases.... Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases
pending in different trial courts").
33. See id. (limiting the permissibility of this practice in situations where "either client would
be adversely affected").
34. See id. at 345-46.
35. Id. (underscoring omitted).
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as opposed to dealing with just an ordinary client. The purpose of
disclosure is to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the
potential conflict. 6 People with a lot of experience with lawyers are

going to appreciate potential conflicts a lot faster than people with less
experience. And I think that it is right to have this EC because there is
no reason to mandate that clients pay lawyers by the hour-or that
lawyers waste clients' time-to explain boilerplate information that
clients already know. Simply put, if the client already knows it, it is not
necessary to say it.
However, be careful of the last sentence in the next full paragraph
of EC 5-16, which states: "In all cases in which the fact, validity or
propriety of client consent is called into question, the lawyer must bear
the burden of establishing that consent was properly obtained and relied
upon by the lawyer." 7 So if the client later says that "the lawyer never
told me this" or that "the lawyer explained this conflict but did not say
how it might play out," the burden will be on the attorney to show that
he made a reasonable disclosure under the circumstances. 3 I would go
back to Grace Moran's statement that you ought to have a writing and,
relating her advice to the language in EC 5-15, not only does each client
have to consent, but preferably each client's consent should be in
writing." It does not take very much effort to get a vritten disclosure and
it will save you a lot of time in the long run. So please take the time to
put the conflict disclosure in writing and, if you can do so, get it signed
by the client. If you cannot get a client to sign a disclosure letter, send
the client a letter reciting the potential conflicts and the implications that
you have explained orally and confirming the client's oral consent.
The next full paragraph is vitally important. There is such a thing as
a non-consentable conflict. There are conflicts that are so serious that
even if a client is willing to consent to them, the attorney cannot accept
that consent. It is impossible to draw a bright black and white line that
can clearly divide consentable from non-consentable conflicts, but EC 516 gives a lot of guidance. "3 It provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f a
disinterested lawyer would conclude that any of the affected clients
should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See i& at 338.
1d at 346 (underscoring omitted).
See id.
See id. at 345-46.
See id. at330.
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lawyer involved should not [even] ask for ...[the client's consent and
should not] provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.""
What is a "disinterested lawyer?" It is not an actual lawyer. It is a
fictional lawyer who has no financial interest in whether or not the real
lawyer accepts or continues the representation. A disinterested lawyer is
a fictional lawyer whose only role is to advise the client whether or not
to consent to a conflict. And if a disinterested lawyer would advise a
client not to consent-if a disinterested lawyer would say, for example,
"this conflict is so serious that no client should consent to it,"-then
even if the client offers her consent and urges the lawyer to accept or
continue the representation, the lawyer still cannot accept or rely on that
consent.
In order to make full disclosure, of course, sometimes a lawyer has
to tell his client the details about another client's plan. For example, if
one client wants to open up a store in a strip mall, that client should
know that his lawyer has another client that also wants to open up a store
nearby. But the lawyer cannot tell one client about the other client unless
the other client gives that lawyer permission to tell him. But as my father
always asked, "Does Macy tell Gimbal?" Sometimes the attorney is not
going to be able to get the consent to disclose the confidences that he
would need to disclose in order to obtain informed consent, but he
cannot take on the representation if he cannot make a full disclosure." It
is not going to be a valid excuse for the attorney to say that he wanted to
tell his client but could not do it. If the attorney cannot tell him, the
attorney cannot get consent.
EC 5-18 is partly new, partly old, and partly just moved around. I
think of it as mostly a rule for lawyers who represent large
organizations. It is not really a small business type of rule. The first
sentence of EC 5-18 says that if an attorney represents an organization,
then he only represents the organization itself and does not, unless he
has a separate agreement, represent the directors, officers, shareholders,
or others noted in the EC. When an attorney represents a small
business, it is tough to draw the line. There are even cases in New York
that say that if the attorney does not expressly disclaim representation of
the individuals when he represents a fifty-fifty corporation, he
automatically is considered to represent the individuals." I do not think
that it is a great business getter for an attorney to say that he does not
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (underscoring omitted).
See id. at 341.
See id. at 396.
See id. at 332-33.
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represent the individuals who founded and now run the business, but
rather represents only the corporation, and that he really does not care
about the individuals. But EC 5-18 demands that the lawyer for an
organization put the interests of the organization ahead of the individuals
who run it."5
C. Canon 7---"A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within
the Bounds of the Law"
EC 7-18 has been substantially expanded. Much of it is entirely
new. The new material says that "[A] lawyer may properly advise a
client to communicate directly with a represented person." 4' DR 7-104 is
the so-called "no contact rule.""9 A lawyer cannot communicate with a
party represented by counsel on the subject matter of the representation
without the consent of the opposing lawyer unless authorized by law."
Inasmuch as a lawyer usually does not get consent, this requirement is
usually insurmountable unless he is authorized by law, and if the lawyer
is not a district attorney in a criminal case and is not taking a deposition
in a civil case, then he is not authorized by law." So essentially, the no
contact rule provides that a lawyer cannot communicate with a party
represented by counsel. It also provides that the lawyer cannot cause
another to communicate if the lawyer personally would not be allowed
to do so.5' But what about the lawyer's own client? Can a lawyer ask his
own client if he wants to save some hassle and some legal fees, and get
around that obstreperous lawyer on the other side by talking directly
with the opposing party? Can the lawyer suggest to his client that the
client just approach the other side and see if the dispute or the deal can
be worked out? Would that violate DR 7-104? The lawyer is, after all,
causing another to communicate. Before the 1999 Amendments, there
was a debate about this question. Some people thought yes, some people
thought no. The Professional Responsibility Committee of the New
York City Bar said that if it is the client's idea, then the lawyer can tell
the client that it is okay. 2 The lawyer can also tell the client that he has

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at396.
See id. at 458-59.
Id at 458 (alteration in original) (underscoring omitted).
Id. at 448.
See id. at447.
See id. at 449.
See id. at 447.
See id. at 458.
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the right to do this, but the lawyer could not tell the client what to say.
That would be improper.
Now, DR 7-104(B) has settled the debate. It rejects the New York
City Bar approach. It says that "a lawyer may cause a client to
communicate with a represented party, if that party is legally competent,
and counsel the client with respect to those communications, provided
the lawyer gives reasonable advance notice to the represented party's
counsel that such communications will be taking place."53 Reasonable
advance notice is notice that provides the opposing lawyer with enough
time to advise his client!" The result of DR 7-104(B) is that the lawyer
does not need the other lawyer's consent to have his client talk to the
other side, and under EC 7-18 the lawyer can also advise a client with
respect to those communications.55 Just remember that the lawyer must
provide the other party's lawyer with reasonable advance notice before
doing so."
What does "reasonable advance notice" mean? There is a specific
line in both EC 7-18 and DR 7-104 that permits a lawyer to encourage
client-to-client communications "provided the lawyer gives reasonable
advance notice to the represented party's counsel that such
communications will be taking place."57 My idea is that reasonable
advance notice is a flexible concept. I think that it means at least long
enough for the opposing lawyer to get in touch with her client. In most
situations, therefore, I would think at least one business day would be
the minimum amount of advance notice that would be reasonable. If
direct client-to-client communications take place and the other lawyer
says she was never able to get in touch with her client before they went
forward, then the lawyer who initiated the client-to-client
communication might be in trouble. I also think that if the lawyer has
already scheduled the meeting three weeks in advance, he could not wait
until the day before to tell the other lawyer. While I do not think the
lawyer has to notify the opposing lawyer the minute she finds out that
her client is going to be meeting with the opposing client, I do believe
that last minute notice is not "reasonable." Reasonable advance notice,
according to EC 7-18, "means notice provided sufficiently in advance of
the direct client-to-client communications, and of sufficient content, so
that the represented person's lawyer has an opportunity to advise his or
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 447.
See id. at 456.
See id. at 455-56.
See id. at 456.
Id. at 447.
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CONCLUSION

This basically completes my discussion of the amendments to the
ECs. I think the amendments are helpful but I hope that in the future
some additional ECs will emerge to explain rules such as DR 1-105,
DR 2-111,6' and DR 5-111. 6 These are new rules that really could use
some additional explanation.
-

63. See id. at51-52.
64. See i. at 202-03.
65. See hi at 406-07.
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her own client with respect to the client-to-client communications before
they take place."58 I think if the lawyer is sending papers, he has to send
those papers to the opposing lawyer also.
The lawyer also has to advise the client against engaging in
abusive, harassing, or unfair conduct." Observe that this is an
affirmative obligation. It is not enough that the lawyer did not encourage
the client to engage in abusive, harassing, or unfair conduct. The lawyer
has to affirmatively say to the client that the client cannot engage in
abusive, harassing, or unfair conduct when talking to the other side.
How much the lawyer has to fill that out probably depends on how well
the lawyer knows his client. Grace Moran pointed out that in
matrimonial cases, improper conduct by clients is going to be a problem.
If the lawyer has a problem client, I think he ought to warn that client
more sternly.
Finally, for those who go into their own litigation, there is a
thoughtful, yet opaque sentence in EC 7-18 which reads that "[a] lawyer
who is a party or who is otherwise personally involved in a legal matter
or transaction, whether appearing pro se or represented by counsel, may
communicate with a represented person on the subject matter of the
representation pursuant to the provisions of DR 7-104(A) and (B). '' o I
am not sure what this means. If it means pursuant to provisions of DR 7104(A), what good does this do? One has always been able to
communicate subject to DR 7-104(A) so what is the meaning of this
sentence? I think it means that the lawyer-party, whether represented or
pro se, may communicate directly with the other party either with the
consent of the represented party's lawyer pursuant to DR 7-104(A), or
upon reasonable advance notice to the represented party's lawyer
pursuant to DR 7-104(B). 6' With a non-lawyer client, if the client wants
to talk to the opposing party without the opposing lawyer's knowledge
or consent, that client may do so. But if the client is both a lawyer and a
litigant, he has to give advance notice to the opposing lawyer before he
can undertake his own communication. 6

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 459 (underscoring omitted).
See id.
Id. (underscoring omitted).
See id. at 458.
See id.
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